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MAY 18 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SE/1  
FROM : SE/FI/CE  
SUBJECT : CE Review of APPLE Trial

1. The Albanian show trial of six APPLE agents and two internal contacts of the team lasted from 5 to 13 April 1954 at the Brigades Cinema in Tirana. The trial was conducted by the Judicial Council of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of Albania. Death sentences were imposed on 13 April 1954 on all except one of the contacts, Ibrahim Lamchi, who was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
2. Zenel Ali Shehu was reported arrested on 28 June 1952. Mention is made in the trial by the prosecutor of Tahir Prençi's arrest (presumably about the same time) but not of his disposition. Zenel Shehu may have been betrayed by a contact. However, he may also have acted insecurely because of inadequate understanding of clandestine techniques and because of lack of familiarity with current internal conditions due to a prolonged 13-year absence from the country. The three APPLE team members who exfiltrated safely on 15 June 1952 separated from Zenel Shehu and Tahir Prençi on 28 May in the Martenesh area. The five-man team had arrived in the latter area on 22 May. On 23 May, according to the exfiltrates, the team made three contacts, one of which was Muharren Gjyla, a cousin of Hazhi Gjyla who was one of the three exfiltrates. This may have been an insecure contact. During the trial it was reported that the team had met with a hostile reception in separate contacts with Hazhi Gjyla's wife and sister.
3. Although the debriefing report of the three exfiltrates does not so state, apparently, according to the trial broadcasts, the two remaining team members found their position in the Martenesh area untenable. Thus the prosecutor quotes Zenel Shehu as saying:

"Nobody accepted us at (M) Artenesh; therefore, we were compelled to head for Bulqize. Arriving there, I went to one of my closest friends, who (in reply) got his rifle and shot at me from the window."

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

Although this could be a statement made by the prosecutor for its propaganda value, if the 28 June date of capture is true and the team was not controlled earlier, the validity of the statement is supported by APPLE's W/T message of 3 June 1952 which contains the statement: "Base at Martenesh is not possible." This particular message contained a negative control response to a case officer control challenge, supporting the thesis that the team was not yet controlled. A possibly uncertain aspect of the message, however, is the inclusion of the statement "3 friends are starting for base," since the three exfiltrates, according to their report had separated from the two staybehinds on 28 May. However, the tense of the verb may have been loosely used by the team or mistranslated by the field.

4. The team's messages from 3 June through 27 June, the day before Zenel Shehu's capture, indicate that the team had come to the attention of the security forces. Thus message number 5 on 12 June states the team (or its contacts) were being "pursued", and message number 12 on 27 June states that the area was being watched for air body-drops. The messages also indicate that the team was apparently acting insecurely in making a large number of contacts. Thus message 5 of 12 June reports 5 friends as "working for us." An unexplained aspect of the team's messages during this period is the following. In response to the base's 27 May raising of the case officer control challenge, "How Many Rifles Have You?" the team returned the negative control response, "We want blankets" not only in its 3 June contact, but although not again rechallenged, in its contacts on 12 June, 15 June (sent in English, contrary to instructions), 18 June (again sent in English), 24 June and 27 June. This excessive repetition conceivably could be an attempt to indicate control. This is not believed probable, however, for later on, when the case officer control challenge was next raised on 12 August 1952, the team replied on 27 August with a positive control answer.
5. The first messages after Zenel Shehu's reported 28 June 1952 arrest were sent on 3 July 1952. It is possible but not probable that Tahir Prençi, the W/T operator, had not yet been captured by the Albanian authorities and did not come into their custody until some time between 28 June and 13 August when APPLE failed to respond to a 12 August case officer control challenge. However, if Prençi was uncontrolled and Shehu had been captured it is probable that Prençi would have reported the latter fact or at least the fact of his

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absence or separation from Shemu. The text of the first message on 3 July is very unclear and follows in full: "Date 5. Circulating that plan.1/ They are put in forced movement (garble) population. It is not yet known when they will depart.2/ Begin 7 until the second understanding.3/" The field placed the following interpretation upon parts of this message keyed to the reference numbers in the text:

1. "Possibly means they will circulate the plan for receiving the drop on the 5th of July.
  2. "This may mean that the population is forced to search for agents or that the army is forced to search (perhaps for Yugoslav teams)."
  3. "Presumably alludes to resupply drops sent in (previous base) messages... " The second understanding' probably means 9 July, the last night in the drop schedule."
- 
6. The lack of clarity in the text could be indicative of a change in operational control. Of possible particular significance is the beginning of the message with "Date 5." It probably does not allude to the projected drop since the latter was set up for the period 6 - 9 July. It may possibly be a rudimentary attempt to indicate control since only two other messages in the APPIE traffic start out this way. (They are the 12 July messages discussed in paragraph 9 below.) "Circulating that plan" makes no apparent sense but may possibly be a poor translation of the Albanian equivalent of "Following plans" which could be a natural message opening for an opposition case officer taking control of a relatively unfamiliar operation for the first time.
  7. The second message on 3 July 1952 is noteworthy because of the fact that it was apparently misnumbered, being numbered 15 instead of the next number in sequence, number 14. The next message on 6 July was numbered 17, number 16 having been skipped. The following message on 12 July reverted back to number 16, the proper number for it if the two previous messages had been numbered correctly. The numbering mix-up may have been a rudimentary effort to indicate control or may have been due to an oversight by the opposition case officer.
  8. The 6 July 1952 message is noteworthy security-wise for the fact that it reported in effect that security conditions were favorable for the drop which was effected during the night of 6 July. The drop itself

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was very suspicious. The plane crew reported that they had to circle the general area of the D/Z three times before they observed the reception lights. Then APPLE reported that the drop was not made at the D/Z, that the pilots had not seen their signals, and that the material had been found by the police (all of which knowledge they would be more likely to have if they were under control). After receipt of this message [ ] rechecked the flight and reported a determination that an error in navigation had been made and that the plane had flown over the wrong place.

"Apparently the bundles were released over a group of lights or shepherd's fires coincidentally resembling a "T" or alert security forces arranged their own reception to divert delivery of our supplies. There would have been time for such a measure as the plane was on its third circle of the area when the lights were first observed."

If the team were under control the poor drop reception technique may simply have been due to inexperience by the opposition service controlling the operation. The second 12 July 1952 message, however, set the stage for the opposition's being in a better position to control future drops by stating that the team knew the local situation best and that its desires should be followed.

9. The two 12 July 1952 messages are noteworthy security-wise for the first being preceded by "Date 7 Time 0100," and the second by "Date 6." Although the reference in both cases may have been to the drop, they may also represent rudimentary attempts at danger or control signals.
10. The texts of all APPLE Team messages up to 25 July 1952 are given in Attachment A.
11. Both Tahir Prenci and Pal Nikolla, the PLUM Team leader who was air-dropped on 4 June 1953, were mentioned by the prosecutor in the trial as having been arrested and there appears to be very little likelihood of their being still at large. In Prenci's case, it is believed that he initially may have played along with the operation in the hopes of warning his base of control, and when the base failed to act on his positive control responses to the case officer challenges, to have refused to ostensibly cooperate further. He may have been

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killed, therefore, about November 1952 when the "fist" switch occurred. Pal Nikolla may have been killed in the course of his interrogations, or may have been sentenced administratively for refusing to cooperate at the trials. The latter may also, of course, have been Prenci's fate. It is possible, however, that Nikolla may have agreed to work for the Sigurimi and have been so used before the APPLE operation blew up. This slight possibility is based on a 25 June 1953 APPLE/2 message reporting learning indirectly that Pal Lushi (presumably Pal Nikolla) had sent one of his people to Halil Branitsa's relatives to say they were in the Mirdita zone. Through such activities the Sigurimi may have sought to uncover other anti-regime personnel.

12. Although the prosecutor charged that Rapush Qerim Agolli (also referred to as Rapush Mocani and Pucja), one of the two internal contacts who was on trial, had sheltered Zenel Shehu and his band in May 1952 and had been entrusted by Shehu with the task of forming an armed band, the three exfiltrates (who did not separate from the rest of the team until 28 May), did not report any such contact by the team. However, the exfiltrates reported staying at Qerim Agolli's house in Molcan from 6 to 8 June 1952 during their exfiltration route. Qerim Agolli is believed to be identical with Rapush Agolli since Qerim is Rapush Agolli's middle name. It would appear, therefore, that the Albanian authorities may have had erroneous information as to the time of contact or our field debriefing of the three exfiltrates was incomplete and that such a contact actually was made in May. The former may be the more probable inasmuch as the three exfiltrates reported that during their 6-8 June 1952 stay at Qerim Agolli's home, they sent him to Korce to purchase cigarettes, newspapers, and other necessary items. The court verdict charged Rapush Agolli, among other things with having purchased various articles in Korce town "for the team."
13. Another item of interest with respect to Rapush Agolli is that the trial prosecutor said that Agolli had made his son's services as guide available to the team which had in turn used them. No mention is made in the trial as to the disposition of the son by the authorities. In view of the family structure, however, it is possible that the son would not be regarded as a free agent by the Albanian authorities who might therefore consider his case relatively lightly. On the other hand, in view of the general Communist disregard for family loyalties, the absence of any report of his arrest may simply be an indication of the son's possible successful escape to the hills.

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14. The trial broadcasts made no specific disclosures as to the time or manner in which the other internal contact on trial, Ibrahim Suleiman Lamce, aided APPLE. His relatively lenient 10-year sentence was attributed by the court to the fact that:

"It has not been proved that the accused Ibrahim Lamce was aware of the general plan of the criminal band headed by Zenel Shehu, . . . The guilt of the accused has been proved by his own full disclosures and by the attributions of the other accused."

It is possible that he was arrested for his earlier assistance to agent teams and that he was included in the trial for propaganda purposes.

15. Both Rapush Agolli and Ibrahim Lamce had been internal contacts of teams on earlier missions and this was brought out at some length in the trial. The former was reported by the court to have been arrested on 29 January 1954; the latter on 25 August 1953. No explanation was given as to why their arrests occurred so long after the first alleged roll-up of APPLE on 28 June 1952. The following explanations appear possible:

- a. It took that long to find the men.
- b. The men were placed under observation to see who else might contact them.
- c. The men were picked up, were broken, and then were released with instructions to report any future contacts or were released under observation to act as decoys for any future contacts.
- d. The dates of arrest of some or all of the team members are false and the operation was not rolled up until at a much later date than claimed in the trial.

16. In the case of Ibrahim Lamce, concerning whom we have no relevant information other than that covered in paragraph 14 above, either one of the first two possibilities discussed in paragraph 15 above appears to be the most probable. In the case of Rapush Agolli the

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second such possibility appears to be most probable for reasons discussed in paragraphs 17 and 18 below.

17. With respect to Rapush Agolli the following additional facts are relevant. The trial court charged him with having provided shelter for five days to Xheladin Tresova (Zheladin Sakoliari (Sakollari)) and the latter's team in September 1952. A radio transmission was allegedly made by the team from Agolli's house. Sakoliari was one of the three original team members who exfiltrated safely on 15 June 1952 and reported having contacted Qerim Agolli on 6-8 June 1952. Sakoliari next became the leader of FIG Team; the latter team had three contacts with a Rapush Agolli of Mocan. During FIG's first mission in 1952 the team stayed at his home during the period 11-16 October 1952 and contacted him again between 1-5 November 1952. The team exfiltrated on 13 November 1952 without mishap. During a 1953 mission by FIG Team, two of the team members on 14 September 1953 contacted a Rapush Agolli who gave the team food and informed them of the recent arrests of potential team contacts. Based on this information, the team radioed its base on 16 September 1953 that four "principal friends" had been arrested or interned. On 25 September 1953 the team radioed the names of eight men arrested from 20 August 1953 to 25 September 1953; included among the eight was a Qerim Rrapushi of Mocan who theoretically may possibly be identical with Rapush Agolli by virtue of the name connections. FIG Team was ambushed by Albanian authorities on 15 October and was very fortunate to be able to escape. The team was probably betrayed by one of its contacts named Adam Zeneli, whose full name is probably Adem Zenel Agolli and who by virtue of the similarity in last names may possibly be related to Rapush Agolli. The trial charge of Rapush Agolli's having aided Sakoliari and his team appears to refer most probably to the contact actually made with FIG in October 1952, particularly since the team had W/T contacts with its base on 11 and 14 October 1952, dates which fall within the 11-16 October 1952 period of the team's reported stay at Rapush Agolli's home. Of possible relevance here is the fact that the message of 14 October reported that the Communists had been able to roll up an internal opposition group by virtue of following up leads obtained by a group posing as a KUBARK team.
18. On the basis of the preceding it would seem that if Rapush Agolli were placed under long-term observation that he did not come under such observation until sometime after mid-November 1952. Otherwise

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it would appear doubtful that FIG would have been able to exfiltrate without mishap in November 1952. Indeed, the earliest opportunity for Rapush Agolli to have come to the attention of the Albanian authorities probably was after the alleged capture of Hamit Matjani on 5 May 1953. Matjani had been one of the three men who separated from the original APPLE team on 28 May 1952 and exfiltrated safely on 15 June; he was reparachuted to the team on 1 May 1953. Sigurimi questioning of him would probably have disclosed the exfiltration group's June 1952 contact with Agolli. The latter may then have been placed under observation. It is possible, therefore, that FIG's ambush in October 1953 may have been due to leads obtained from such an observation; there may also have been some culpable connection between Adem Zenel Agolli and Rapush Agolli. It is also possible that Rapush Agolli may have been picked up in September 1953 or later in January 1954 because of leads furnished the authorities as a result of his contact with FIG.

19. The dates of capture of the other agents in the APPLE/ORANGE/PLUM complex support the thesis of control extending back to Zenel Shehu's alleged apprehension on 28 June 1952. Halil Jusul Branica (Branitza), who was air-dropped on 4 August 1952, was reported captured the same day, allegedly as soon as he landed. Ahmet (Hamit) Agush Kabashi, the relief W/T operator who was air-dropped on 29 January 1953, was also reported captured the same day, also allegedly as soon as he landed. The next drop on 1 May 1953 was that of a three-man team to guide APPLE/3 out. It consisted of Naum Vasil Sula, Hamit Hasan Matjani and Gani Mehmet Malushi who were allegedly captured on 1 May 1953, 5 May 1953 and 5 May 1953 respectively. No explanation was advanced as to the different dates of capture. It is possible that the latter two were able to somehow elude capture for four days even though the D/Z was controlled, or that they were let alone and kept under observation for possible leads prior to capture. Of possible relevance in this connection is a 6 May 1953 APPLE radio report on the drop which stated that Naum Sula had been injured in the drop. The field at the time regarded his injury as normal since it was Sula's first jump and he was regarded as the least capable man. The five agents discussed in this paragraph and Zenel Shehu constituted the six agents who were tried and sentenced to death.
20. Four other men were air-dropped to APPLE on 4 June 1953. The three who were members of the ORANGE team were Hazhi Gjyla, Nuri Flaka and



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Zenon Gjollen, all three of whom were reported in a 29 December 1953 Tirana broadcast to have been killed upon landing. During the course of the trial they like the PLUM Team leader, Pal Nikolla, who was also air-dropped on 4 June 1953, were mentioned as having been arrested at the moment of landing. No further mention was made in the trial of their disposition. It is possible, therefore, that the three ORANGE Team members may actually have been killed during the course of their interrogations or may have been sentenced administratively for refusing to cooperate at the trials.

21. Aside from technical witnesses at the trial such as equipment experts, seventeen individuals are named as having testified. Of these, information is included with respect to the actual testimony of only eight, all of whose testimony involved alleged previous murders by Hamit Matjani. (Because of the latter's position as an opposition figure of almost legendary proportions to the Albanians, a special effort was made to belittle him by characterizing him as a bandit and murderer.) Although there is no indication in the broadcasts as to the nature of the testimony of the other nine known witnesses it is probable that their testimony was similar in nature to the other eight. The possibility remains that one or more may have been involved in the capture of the team. No relevant traces have been found on any of the eight except possibly for one - Tahir Demollari. In the SE/1 CE card file, the card for Tahir Demolap, who may be identical with Tahir Demollari bears the notation, "See operations file." Unfortunately there is no further identifying data on the file involved and it cannot be found. There is also a reference in the testimony of Naum Sula, one of the defendants in the trial, to a Tahir Demollar as having been one of the internal contacts in 1949 of a Greek I. S. team of which Sula had been a member. The names of the eight witnesses whose testimony is unknown follows: Shefit Ismail Elezi of Peqin; Shuqeri Imer Sinani of Murqu in Elbasan; Dervish Juba of Dragaj-Kosej Village, Peqin District; Loni Ngjeli Marka of Lushnje; Iaha Hassallaj of Garunjas Village, Lushnje District; Bajram Hasa of Gramsh; Muhamet Qako; Musa Kollolli; and Tahir Demollari. In addition to being the subject of other checks, these names were checked without result against the names of eleven contacts radiced by APPLE on 12 March 1953 and against the names of the eight persons FIG reported arrested in its W/T contact of 25 September 1953.
22. Each of the defendants during his testimony gave the true names of a number of men with whom he had worked in the past as fellow agents

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or with whom he had had some operational contact within the country during earlier missions. Attachment B provides an alphabetical listing of the individuals so named and such disclosure should be noted in the RI index or the branch CE card files.

22. With regard to CIA staff personnel, no true full names were disclosed during the trial except that of [ ] , a contract agent who left the [ ] in the fall of 1951. The true first names of only two staff personnel were disclosed, i.e., "Michael", "Maiko" and "Miaku" for [ ] ; and "Georgi" for [ ] . Attachment C provides an alphabetical listing of the operational aliases disclosed in the trial and the identities of the individuals who used the aliases. The trial proceedings indicate that the Albanian authorities are confused as to the periods of duty in Greece of some of the individuals and have placed some of them as having been involved in Albanian operations prior to their arrival in Greece.
23. Some information concerning the methods of training and physical location of holding and training areas for agents in Greece was disclosed in the trial. The following areas were specifically mentioned:
- a. "Klisadhi" (Glifadha)
  - b. "Katsika" ("Kocika," "Kacikas") near Ioannina (Janina)
  - c. House near "Ayios Nikolaos Station" (Haxhi Nikolla Station)
  - d. House No. 5 in "Kalmaki" ("Kolonaki") quarter.
  - e. 1501 "Monadha" office
  - f. "Giza" quarter house.

Not all of these areas have been definitely identified but they are believed to include areas used several years ago by team members in earlier missions. The branch has stated that the two areas still in use, i.e., the Ranch and an apartment in Kolonaki quarter near the one mentioned above, are in the process of being dropped.

24. All of APPLE's supplies and equipment (weapons, clothing, documentation, poisons, radio equipment and gold) were captured, subjected to detailed examination, and exhibited and reported on at the trial. The testimony of the experts reflects high TSS-type capabilities for the Albanians. The highlights of this testimony are given in the

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FBIS Daily Reports of 20 and 21 April 1954, LL 31-34 and LL 19-21 respectively. Alleged proof of the United States' origin of the radios and of some of the footwear, parachutes, and garments were cited. Although in some instances the testimony is believed by the branch to be false, because other clothing than that described was actually issued the agents, the testimony appears to indicate that the supplies and equipment were not as sterile as desirable and that corrective action is desirable in future operations. This could involve more procurement in Germany.

25. The trial would appear to be worthy of psychological study in terms of possible psychological pre-conditioning of the defendants by hypnosis, brain-washing, drugs or other means. The testimony of Zenel Shehu and Hamit Matjani is particularly interesting in this respect. Their testimonies have a particularly rehearsed appearance. Zenel Shehu at times was a particularly reluctant witness, responding initially with "I beg your pardon" to possibly particularly repugnant queries.
26. Gani Malushi stated in his testimony that his team on an earlier mission had provided fabricated information to the AIS. This testimony may have been true or may have been deliberate deception instigated by the Albanians.

#### CONCLUSIONS:

27. The 28 June 1952 date of the alleged initial assumption of control of the operation is partially substantiated by the subsequent APPLE W/T messages.
28. The relatively delayed arrests of the internal contacts would appear to be due most probably to the fact that it took that long to find Ibrahim Lamce and that Rapush Agolli was placed under long-term observation to see who might contact him before he was arrested.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS:

29. All names mentioned in the trial should be indexed for the RI Central Index.
30. The field's progress in getting rid of compromised holding areas still in use should be checked periodically.

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31. Corrective action with respect to procurement of supplies and equipment, as discussed in paragraph 24, should be taken. ✓
32. The substance of paragraph 25 should be called to the attention ✓  
of the appropriate agency staff.
33. The SE/1 Reports Officer should study any past intelligence dissemina-  
tions with respect to the situation discussed in paragraph 26, to  
see whether any action is required of him. A similar study might  
be made by him of all intelligence disseminations based on informa-  
tion provided by APPLE after the date of its alleged coming under  
control.
34. Green List checks should be made, where such checks have not already  
been accomplished, of the following:
  - a. All witnesses in the trial, particularly those whose  
testimony is unknown.
  - b. All persons listed in Attachment B, "Individuals Im-  
plicated in an Operational Capacity in APPLE Trial." ✓
  - c. All aliases listed in Attachment C, "Operational Aliases  
Disclosed in Trial and Their Related True Identities."
  - d. All holding and training areas listed in paragraph 23  
above.

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Distribution:

Addressee - Orig. & 1 (w/atts)  
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SE/CE - 1 (w/atts)

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ATTACHMENT A

Incoming APPIE W/T Messages, 8 May- 25 July 1952

NUMBER	DATE	MESSAGE
1.	8 May 1952	Food lights set tonight. (Drop preparation.)
2.	27 May 1952	Received food.
3.	27 May 1952	Arrived well. Do not send from outside. Plan without news.
4.	3 June 1952	We want blankets. Base at Martanesh is not possible. We are at Item 1312 Item 1312. 3 friends are starting for base. We will send word later.
5.	12 June 1952	We want blankets. We have had few contacts but ignore it. <u>Do not fly in this zone because they (or we) are pursued.</u> <u>We have found 5 friends who are now working for us.</u> Since March the whole trusted population has been armed to pursue groups GARBIE. The whole population is trying to avoid the call of the government.
6.	12 June 1952	We will look for the plane with the new moon. For other news expect it less often. We are economizing on our batter y.
7.	15 June 1952.	We want blankets. Stay calm the job is in order. We are at item 1412 item 1412. Frederick. (Pseudo for team leader)
8.	18 June 1952.	We received your message. We want blankets. Send two batteries, three complete sets of clothing, soap bread, flour, sugar, rice, coffee for seven persons for three months. Five sleeping bags, medicine, twelve automatics six rifles, six revolvers. <u>We will be waiting for you on July seventh at twenty two hundred.</u> Will send D/Z later. <u>Twelve persons are working for us.</u>
9.	18 June 1952	Crystal Number 6138 does not work.
10.	24 June 1952	We want blankets. Do not be doubtful. The definite base is (one word garble) DZ Item 1431 Item 1431. If you wish send streptomycin because one of our friends working with us is T. B.
11.	24 June 1952	In the Diber area there is one div (garble) 8 10, 020 with German and Russian arms. The whole border from Librazh (I-1785) to Kukes (J-0743) is guarded outside of this zone the guarding is done by border guards.

ATTACHMENT A

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>MESSAGE</u>
12.	27 June 1952	We want blankets. D/Z for many supplies. We want 7 July. For bodies we do not have place now. Later we will make contact about a meadow. These plains are being watched for persons.
13.	3 July 1952	(NOTE: First message after alleged capture of Zenel.) <u>Date 5.</u> Circulating that plan. They are put in forced movement (garble) population. It is not yet known when they will depart. Begin 7 until the second understanding.
<u>15.</u>	3 July 1952	In Mat they are working to fix the center.* About 3,000 workers volunteers but with pay. Most of them are from the North (garble of four letters). *Field interpretation: Possibly the large power station under construction in this area or a railroad.
<u>17</u>	6 July 1952	The police force are not circulating. Situation is quiet. Our friends inform us the forces are looking for groups of men coming from Yugoslavia.
16.	12 July 1952	<u>Date 7 Time 0100.</u> The airplane circled the area for one hour (garble) Bulqiz. Friends inform us that the material has been dropped near the seminary (in English) of Bulqiz. The material has been found by the police. We are placed (garbled-possibly "in the zone"). We are obligated to lower in wooded areas.
<u>17</u>	12 July 1952	<u>Date 6.</u> I am notifying you about the drop. It was away from the specified D/Z and they did not reach us. The pilots made the drop without seeing our signals. Last night we and our friends saw (garble). We know the situation here. That is why each drop should be made as we like and where our signals are.
18.	15 July 1952	The tie-up with your drop among the population is that other persons have been dropped. Some say the material has been dropped for Bilal Kolen.* There is not much news. *A Yugoslav team leader.
19.	15 July 1952	We are looking for new DZ. In the coming drop we desire bat (garble but probably batteries.) We have only one pair of b (garble). It is difficult to tie-up (presumably means make contact).

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ATTACHMENT A

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<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>MESSAGE</u>
20.	18 July 1952	In Burrel there is (garble presumably "unit") about the size of an infantry and artillery regiment (garble probably "since") 8 June
21.	18 July 1952	In the Diber Zone there is a battalion of border soldiers, with German arms and not a division (garble) uniform.
22.	18 July 1952	D/Z. D/Z. I. 12. I. A. We are located in the Mati zone.
23.	25 July 1952.	We are in a situation to await Halil. Good D/Z. The situation is quiet. Halil is very necessary because he will give us first hand authority for a larger zone of action. Most of the bases (garble) in the Mate (could also be "coast" or "border" but less probable) and DUKAGIN the movement is more secure.

ATTACHMENT B

Individuals Implicated In An Operational  
Capacity in APPLE Trial

- |                        |                       |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Hasan AHMETI        | 38. Ismahil UPPELLARI |
| 2. Riza ALIU           | 39. Izer VRAZHDO      |
| 3. Safeth ALUSHI       | 40. Rakip ZOGUN       |
| 4. Vasil ANDONI        |                       |
| 5. Muharrem BAJRAKTARI |                       |
| 6. Said BEDIENI        |                       |
| 7. Neshad BEDO         |                       |
| 8. Bequir (BEGOJA)     |                       |
| 9. Destan BERISHA      |                       |
| 10. Izet BERAZHDA      |                       |
| 11. Xhevdet BLUSHMI    |                       |
| 12. Shafki CACANI      |                       |
| 13. Muhamet CAMI       |                       |
| 14. Tahir DEMOLLAR     |                       |
| 15. Zhafer DEVA        |                       |
| 16. Fetah DIKA         |                       |
| 17. Shamet DILO        |                       |
| 18. Leka EIMAZI        |                       |
| 19. Fetah GJIKA        |                       |
| 20. Zemm GJOJEKA       |                       |
| 21. Hilmi HALILI       |                       |
| 22. Ibrahim KABASHI    |                       |
| 23. Shqir KALLLOLLI    |                       |
| 24. Demo KATANI        |                       |
| 25. Qerim KODENI       |                       |
| 26. Bido KOTORI        |                       |
| 27. Alush IESHANJAKU   |                       |
| 28. Ismail MAHMUTTI    |                       |
| 29. Safet MALUSHI      |                       |
| 30. Iesh (Lek) MARTINI |                       |
| 31. Pajo MILECI        |                       |
| 32. Bilal MURATI       |                       |
| 33. Irfan OHRI         |                       |
| 34. Haki RUSHITI       |                       |
| 35. Hysein SELMANI     |                       |
| 36. Daut SULA          |                       |
| 37. Ali TRUEHOVA       |                       |



Attachment C

Operational Aliases Disclosed In Trial And  
Their Related True Identities

<u>Alias</u>	<u>True Name</u>
1. "Budo", "Bido"	Staff Officer
2. "Charles"	[ ] , contract agent
3. "Chesti"	[ ] , contract agent
4. Mr. "Field" (in Paris)	[ ]
5. "Jack"	Possibly [ ]
6. Major "Jani Gjioni" (an American)	[ ] , staff officer
7. "Jim"	[ ] , staff officer
8. "Colonel John"	[ ] , staff officer
9. "John".	[ ] , staff officer
10. "Niko", "Niko Ceci," "Nikocetis"	Unidentified
11. "Peshku"	[ ] , contract agent
12. "Quoce", "Qose"	[ ] , staff officer
13. "Riko"	[ ] , w/t training officer.